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The Warning Shot Was Heard Only in France: Inside Europe's Second Cold-Chain Attack

Writer: RubyComm Team
RubyComm Team
Nov 3
7 min read

About three weeks after hundreds of French supermarkets lost their chilled and frozen stock, it happened again. In the early hours of Monday, November 2, 2026, attackers took control of refrigeration systems in grocery stores across at least six European countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Ireland, Estonia and the Netherlands.


Belgium was hit hardest, with more than 50 affected stores identified. Delhaize, Carrefour and Spar were among the chains affected there, and Delhaize stores were also hit in Luxembourg. In Sweden, ICA and Coop stores found their freezers set to 50°C (122°F). One Swedish store manager told broadcaster TV4 that staff could not change the temperatures back while hot air blew into the freezers, and that all the stock was lost.


As in France, no group has claimed responsibility and no authority has named a perpetrator. It is not yet known whether the same actors are behind both waves.

In our October post, The Weaponized Cold Chain, we argued that refrigeration is a critical choke point. The second wave answers a different question: what did Europe do with the warning? Outside France, the honest answer appears to be: not enough.


Same playbook, three weeks later


The mechanism did not change. According to Belga, the Belgian news agency, the attackers remotely switched the units' evaporators into defrost mode, the same method used in France. Defrost is a normal, scheduled function. Run without its limits, it turns a freezer into an oven, and every command involved looks legitimate.

The equipment did not change either.


In Estonia, a contractor said the attackers accessed an older Danfoss system, and Dutch broadcaster NOS reported that Copeland equipment was also targeted in Belgium. 


After the French attack, both vendors said the affected devices were mainly discontinued products that no longer receive security updates after ANSSI had already named Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers and the Copeland and Dixell xweb monitoring systems as the usual suspects.


The timing is worth noting. Both waves started overnight from Sunday into Monday, exactly three weeks apart: October 11 to 12 in France, November 1 to 2 elsewhere in Europe. Stores are closed, contractors are off shift, and the damage is found only when the morning team opens the cold rooms. Whether or not that was deliberate, it is the window defenders should plan for.


The first wave was also larger than early reports suggested. The Paris prosecutor's office now puts the number of victims of the October attack at around 700.


Unfortunately, the warning was heard only in France


This is the central lesson of the second wave, and public scan data makes it visible.

Before October, the exposure was stable and in plain sight. IPinfo's weekly internet scans found roughly 2,500 to 2,600 Danfoss StoreView dashboards open to the internet from late March 2026 until the attack, about half of them in France. They were largely the same devices, week after week.


After the French attack, French operators moved fast. Censys counted 1,825 exposed StoreView instances in France on October 11 and 537 on October 14, a 71% drop in three days. IPinfo observed a similar drop.


But Censys also found two less reassuring things. First, operators were disconnecting devices, not patching them: the share running fixed firmware did not grow. Second, the reaction was largely French. Among exposed instances on October 11, Censys reported that 76% in Belgium and 81% in Poland ran below the patched version, a worse share than France's 74%. The Netherlands still had 62 exposed, unpatched instances that day.


Three weeks later, Belgium and the Netherlands were on the victim list. We cannot prove those specific devices were the ones attacked. However, the pattern is still hard to ignore: national alerts travel country by country, while attackers work across the whole continent. A CERT-FR alert does not reach a store manager in Brussels or a refrigeration contractor in Tallinn.


A secure connection is not a secure controller


Two details from the second wave deserve more attention than they have received.

The first comes from Sabcobel, the Belgian installer that operates Delhaize's refrigeration systems. Its CEO said technicians worked through the night to disconnect affected units from the network, and that most customers had moved to managing their refrigeration over a secure internet connection after the French attack. He also said that a thorough fix requires physical modification of the units, not just a software update (that is why RubyComm’s Rubyk-OT was invented!).


The second comes from Sweden. An ICA spokesperson told Dagens Nyheter that the affected stores were a small number whose connection ran outside ICA's central network.


Read together, these point to the real weak link: the remote-access path. It is often installed and owned by a refrigeration contractor, sits outside the retailer's security perimeter, and was never inventoried as part of the attack surface. A VPN encrypts and authenticates that path, which is a real improvement. But it still gives anyone holding valid credentials, or a compromised contractor laptop, full write access to setpoints and defrost parameters.


The main point being that remote monitoring needs data to flow out. But it rarely needs unrestricted commands to flow in. Treating those as one connection is the design weakness these attacks depend on.


End of life is a vendor policy, not a fix


The Danfoss AK-SM 800 was declared end of life in May 2021, and the AK-SC 355 was phased out in 2016. In an October 2025 newsletter, Danfoss announced a hard End of Service policy for legacy products that had already reached end of life. It cited recent European cybersecurity legislation and explained that continuing support would bring new legal obligations to keep issuing security updates.


That is the uncomfortable side effect of good regulation. The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) has required manufacturers to report actively exploited vulnerabilities since September 2026, and ENISA has confirmed this covers end-of-life products still in use. But the duty to actually fix vulnerabilities applies only during a support period that the manufacturer defines. For products placed on the market before December 11, 2027, or whose support has already ended, ENISA says there is no obligation to fix. The revised Product Liability Directive is not retroactive either.


As a result of this, we will witness a large installed base of controllers that will run for years, legally orphaned. The vendor has stepped away, the regulator cannot compel a patch, and the risk sits entirely with the operator. In OT, end of life does not mean end of use.


Who should be worried next


Supermarkets are the visible victims, but they are not the only users of these systems.

  • Cold storage and logistics. Claroty's research notes that the affected Danfoss platform is widely deployed beyond stores, in cold-storage facilities and logistics warehouses. A hit there spoils a region's stock before it reaches a shelf.

  • Markets that have not had their wake-up call. Censys data showed Poland with the highest share of unpatched exposed instances among the countries it highlighted, and found exposed, unpatched instances in the United States as well. Israel already experienced this attack pattern in 2022.

  • Healthcare and pharmaceuticals. Hospital blood banks, pharmacy cold rooms and vaccine storage run on the same class of networked refrigeration and building controllers, with far less tolerance for a temperature excursion than a frozen-food aisle.

  • Facilities falling through regulatory cracks. While the EU’s NIS2 Directive designates the food sector as critical, its enterprise size-cap thresholds and varying national transpositions create major blind spots. Independent cold-storage operators, franchised retail stores, and regional logistics hubs frequently fall below the reporting threshold or slip into gray areas outside proactive enforcement. Consequently, the mid-market operators most exposed on the public internet are often the very ones no regulator is checking. 

Defending the controller

Both waves confirmed what we wrote in October: when the attack is a legitimate command, the only reliable control point is the path to the controller itself. Patching cannot help a device that will never be patched, and a VPN cannot tell a technician's command from an attacker's.


  • Rubyk-OT places hardware-enforced protection right next to the controller, physically separating it from shared networks without installing anything on the legacy device. Only explicitly allowed traffic reaches the setpoints.

  • Rubyk-UDR lets monitoring data leave the site in one direction only, so remote dashboards keep working with no inbound path back to the equipment.



How exposed is your cold chain? Contact us at info@rubycomm.com for a cold-chain OT exposure asessment.


About RubyComm


RubyComm Ltd. is an Israeli OT cybersecurity company founded in 2022 by veterans of Israeli intelligence. Headquartered in Ra'anana, Israel, with an office in Boston, Massachusetts, RubyComm builds hardware-enforced security appliances for critical infrastructure: Rubyk-OT, Rubyk-UDR and Rubyk-WiFi. RubyComm works with channel partners in Israel, the United States and Poland. Our approach is built around the realities of OT environments, including legacy systems, operational continuity and limited on-site resources, so that protection does not come at the expense of uptime. Simplified OT Cybersecurity.


Sources


  1. The Record (Recorded Future News), Second wave of suspected cyberattacks hits supermarket freezers across Europe, November 2, 2026.

  2. Help Net Security, Second wave of refrigeration cyberattacks hits European supermarkets, November 2, 2026.

  3. Euronews, Cyberattacks hit supermarket fridges and freezers in Europe, Belgium launches investigation, November 2, 2026.

  4. NBC News, Supermarkets across Europe hit by new fridge cyberattacks, November 2, 2026.

  5. CNBC, Supermarket fridges are under attack in Europe, November 3, 2026.

  6. The Record (Recorded Future News), EU cyber law won't force fixes for fridge controllers hit in French attack, October 20, 2026.

  7. Infosecurity Magazine (citing Censys), France: Internet-Exposed Danfoss Controllers Drop 71% After Cyber-Attack, October 15, 2026.

  8. IPinfo, France's supermarket fridge dashboards exposure analysis, October 2026.

  9. The Hacker News, Attackers heat French supermarket refrigeration, October 2026.

  10. Danfoss, Tech Insider, October 2025.

  11. Security Affairs (citing Claroty Team82), Hackers cranked French supermarkets' freezers up to 50 degrees, October 2026.

  12. RubyComm, The Weaponized Cold Chain: Why the French Supermarket Attack and the "Nine Meals" Warning Should Concern Every OT Defender, October 13, 2026.

 
 
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